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Abstract
On many online auction sites it is now possible for a seller to
augment his auction with a maximum or buy-out price. The use of
this instrument has been justiﬁed in “one-shot” auctions by appeal
to impatience or risk aversion. Here we oﬀer additional justiﬁcation
by observing that trading on internet auctions is not of a “one-shot”
nature, but that market participants expect more transactions in the
future. This has important implications when bidders desire multiple
objects. Speciﬁcally, it is shown that an early seller has an incentive
to introduce a buy-out price, if similar products are oﬀered later on by
other sellers. The buy-out price will increase revenue in the current
auction, but revenue in future auctions will decrease, as will the sum
of revenues. In contrast, if a single seller owns multiple units, overall
revenue will increase, if buyers anticipate the use of buy-out prices in
the future by this seller. In both cases, an optimally chosen buy-out
price introduces potential ineﬃciencies in the allocation.
*E-mail: rkirkegaard@econ.au.dk and povergaard@econ.au.dk. Re-
vised versions will be available at:
http://www.econ.au.dk/vip htm/povergaard/pbohome/pbohome.html
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The presence of buy-out prices1 in online auctions has thus far been explained
by focusing on a single auction and assuming that individuals exhibit either
risk aversion or impatience.2 In this paper we take a somewhat broader view
of auction markets, realizing, in particular, that buyers and sellers alike are
aware of the fact that new products will be oﬀered on the market in the
future. This will tend to depress revenue in today’s auctions, as buyers know
that close substitutes will be oﬀered tomorrow. In this dynamic environment
we will show that there are at least two reasons to introduce buy-out prices,
even if agents are patient and risk neutral.
Buy-out prices or maximum prices in online auctions were noted by
Lucking-Reiley (2000) in his empirical overview of auction activities on the
Internet. Since (sell) auctions are ostensibly staged to illicit high prices in
situations where markets are thin and sellers are short on information about
the willingness-to-pay of potential buyers, such buy-out prices may appear
surprising. In fact, Lucking-Reiley explicitly posed this as a challenge to the-
orists. In addition, he quoted evidence to suggest that the exercise of posted
buy-out options is not uncommon in online auctions.3
Reynolds and Wooders (2002) provide some additional information on
the frequency of buy-out prices in Yahoo! and eBay auctions, though, not
on the frequency with which the option was exercised by some bidder. The
categories sampled on March 27, 2002, were automobiles, clothing, DVD
players, VCR’s, digital cameras and TV sets. A total of 1.248 auctioned items
were sampled from Yahoo!,o fw h i c h842 had a buy-out price posted by the
seller (roughly, 66%). In similar fashion, 31.142 auctioned items were sampled
from eBay,o fw h i c h12.480 had a buy-out price posted by the seller (roughly,
1Alternatively, this is often referred to as buy prices or maximum prices.I n o ﬄine
settings, this phenomenon also has a certain aﬃnity with “$xx or best oﬀer”, where it is,
presumably, implicit that, if someone makes an oﬀer of $xx, then the trade is ﬁnalized
immediately, while if someone makes a lower oﬀer initially, then the seller will wait a while
to see if a better oﬀer comes along. Also, a buy-out price has a certain similarity with a
massive jump bid intended to end an auction quickly.
2See, Budish and Takeyama (2001), Mathews (2002) and Reynolds and Wooders (2002).
In future work we hope to return to the use of buy-out prices in auctions where sellers try
to respond to possible bidder collusion.
3He quotes the case of LabX (a lab equipment auction site), where buy-out options are
exercised by some bidder in 10% of the cases where they appear. Hence, buy-out prices
do more than just attract attention.
240%). There is some variation across the categories of goods sampled, but the
frequency of buy-out prices never drops below 25% in the sample. Hence, in
these categories, at least, the appearance of buy-out prices is very frequent.
For eBay, Mathews (2002) presents some numbers on the frequency with
which buy-out options are exercised when oﬀered.4 For two categories of
games (racing and sports) for Sony PS2, Mathews reports that on January
29 - 30, 2001, 210 items were on oﬀer. A buy-out option was available on 124
items (59%), and it was exercised 34 times (27% of the times it was oﬀered).
So, at least in these categories, the exercise frequency is high.
Formally, we analyze eBay’s version of a buy-out price, termed the Buy
It Now price. Here is how the Buy It Now price roughly works from the
seller’s viewpoint:5 “If a buyer is willing to meet your Buy It Now price
before the ﬁrst bid comes in, your item sells instantly and your auction ends.
Or, if a bid comes in ﬁrst, the Buy It Now option disappears. Then your
auction proceeds normally.” Hence, in eBay auctions, the buy-out price is
temporary.6
Throughout this paper we assume that potential buyers or bidders have
multi-unit demands, with diminishing marginal utility. With two objects for
sale and at least two bidders, it has been shown by Black and de Meza (1992)
that auction revenue will increase over time and that the auction outcome
is eﬃcient under these assumptions. In particular, in a sequence of second-
price or English auctions, the seller oﬀering his good today will not earn as
much as a competing seller oﬀering a similar good tomorrow, that is, prices
are increasing.7
However, for the case with two individual sellers, we show that the ﬁrst
seller can always increase his revenue by introducing a buy-out price. The
4He also presents aggregate numbers on the frequency with which buy-out prices are
oﬀered at eBay. The reported range around 40% is roughly in line with the numbers
reported for speciﬁc categories by Reynolds and Wooders (2002).
5For more details on the eBay version and other versions of a buy-out price, see e.g.
Lucking-Reiley (2000), Budish and Takeyama (2001), Mathews (2002) and Reynolds and
Wooders (2002).
6For more details on the Buy It Now feature in eBay auctions the reader should consult
pages.ebay.com/help/sell/bin.html. eBay introduced this feature in January 2001.
7In fact, Black and de Meza (1992) were interested in what some have referred to as The
Declining Price Anomaly. Therefore, they went on to consider an option of the following
kind: the winner of the ﬁrst item is given the option of buying the second item at the
same price. This, apparently, is observed in certain multi-unit auctions, and it is enough
to lead to a declining price path.
3revenue to the second seller is adversely aﬀe c t e d ,a si so v e r a l lr e v e n u e . A n
optimally chosen buy-out price in the ﬁrst auction also introduces ineﬃ-
ciency, in the sense that a bidder who should have won no object wins one.
Our analysis is partial in the following sense. We consider a sequence of two
second-price (or English) auctions, allowing the ﬁrst seller the possibility of
introducing a buy-out price without giving the second seller the opportunity
to respond in kind. Thus, we essentially show that an auction market with-
out buy-out prices is unstable, in the sense that current sellers will try to
force the auction site to (at least temporarily) allow buy-out prices.
Next, we consider the consequences of buy-out prices for a single seller
intending to sell two objects. We show that this seller can increase his total
expected revenue by augmenting the second auction with a buy-out price,
which depends on the outcome of the ﬁrst auction. The buy-out price should
be set fairly low, thus allowing the winner of the ﬁrst auction a dispropor-
tionately large chance of winning the second auction as well. Hence, the
sequence of auctions is ineﬃcient, in the sense that one buyer may win two
objects when eﬃciency dictates he should only win one.I nt h i sc a s eo v e r a l l
revenue will increase. The reason is the same as that which induces a mo-
nopolist to oﬀer quantity discounts that are detrimental to eﬃciency: buyers
with high demand contribute with higher marginal revenue on two objects
than buyers with low demand do on one object.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set up
a simple model and present the results for the bench-mark case where a
sequence of two second-price auctions is staged. Then, Section 3 shows that
the ﬁrst seller among a pack of competing sellers can increase his lot by
oﬀering a buy-out price. Section 4 then examines the use of buy-out prices
by a single seller oﬀering more than one good. Section 5 contains a few
concluding remarks. A selection of proofs is in the Appendix.
2M o d e l a n d B e n c h - M a r k
In this section we ﬁrst set up the model and then derive results for the
bench-mark case where a sequence of two second-price auctions is staged.
42.1 Model
We assume that two objects are oﬀered for sale sequentially,8 and that there
are two potential buyers on the market. Hence, the number of objects co-
incide with the number of buyers, this number being equal to two in order
to make the analysis manageable. Each buyer i, i =1 ,2, is characterized
by a type, vi, drawn from a continuously diﬀerentiable distribution function,
F(vi), without mass points. We assume that vi ∈ [v,v]. The value to bidder
i of the ﬁrst unit purchased is vi, while the value of the second unit is kvi,
0 <k<1. Hence, each bidder desires both units, but individual demands
are downward sloping.
2.2 Two straight second-price auctions
To keep the analysis simple, we have ignored reserve prices in the auctions. In
this setting, Black and de Meza (1992) were the ﬁrst9 to solve for equilibrium
strategies in a sequence of two second-price (or English) auctions, under
more general assumptions than those considered here.10 Applied to our set
of assumptions, they ﬁnd the following.
Proposition 1 (Black and de Meza (1992)) When there are two a pri-
ori symmetric agents in the game, the unique symmetric equilibrium is for
agent i to bid kvi in stage one, and bid vi in stage two if stage one was lost,
and kvi otherwise. The equilibrium outcome is eﬃcient.
Thus, in the last round, a bidder simply bids his valuation of the remain-
ing object. This, however, depends on whether the bidder won or lost the
ﬁrst object. In the ﬁrst round, each bidder bids k times his valuation for the
ﬁrst item won. Hence, the ﬁr s to b j e c ti ss o l df o rap r i c ee q u a lt ok times
the lowest valuation, while the second object is sold for a price equal to the
8The two objects are considered homogenous by the bidders, or they are simply two
units of the same good.
9See also Katzman (1999).
10Black and de Meza explicitly consider sealed-bid auctions, while they also have an
informal discussion of English auctions. Throughout our formal analysis, we restrict at-
tention to a setting with two bidders, in which case second-price and English auctions are
equivalent. With more than two bidders this equivalence may break down. In the infor-
mal discussion immediately below, we comment on some key properties of second-price,
sealed-bid auctions with arbitrary numbers of bidders.
5maximum of k times the highest valuation and the lowest valuation. From
this, it follows immediately that the revenue of the ﬁrst auction is lower than
the revenue of the second.
To see what is going on here, let us start by making a few general remarks
on second-price, sealed-bid auctions in the independent, private values case
with n bidders. We ﬁrst note that in case of symmetric, increasing bidding
strategies, the ﬁne details of any bidder’s bid function are only consequential
if there happens to be a competing bidder who has a valuation very close
to that of the bidder in question. Hence, in equilibrium a bidder’s strategy
is pinned down by an indiﬀerence relation: the bidder should be indiﬀerent
between winning and losing, if his toughest competitor is identical to himself.
To proceed, let us take the perspective of bidder i and label his rivals j,
j =1 ,2,....,n − 1.N o w ,i’s competitors have random valuations of the ﬁrst
item denoted Yi with associated order-statistics Y[1] ≥ Y[2] ≥ .... ≥ Y[n−1].
Let i be male and all the rivals female.
In a one-shot, second-price auction bidder i essentially bids what he ex-
p e c t si tt ot a k et ow i nt h ei t e m ,if he is the “top dog” - the high-valuation
bidder - and there is someone like him among the rivals. The relevant indif-
f e r e n c er e l a t i o nc a nb ew r i t t e na s
just winning
z }| {




However, E(Y[1] | Y[1] = vi)=vi, and the optimal bid of i is given by
b(vi)=E(Y[1] | Y[1] = vi)=vi
Thus, we obtain the familiar result that it is optimal for bidder i to bid his
valuation.
In a sequence of two second-price auctions things are a little more compli-
cated. Consider the last round ﬁrst. If i won the ﬁrst item, his valuation of
the second item is v2
i = kvi. Then, in the last round, bidder i’s indiﬀerence
relation is predicated on Y[1] = kvi (the toughest competitor is like him at












where b2(·) denotes the second-round bid. Substituting for v2
i and noting





2(kvi)=E(Y[1] | Y[1] = kvi)=kvi
6Similarly, if i lost the ﬁrst item, his valuation of the second item is v2
i =
vi. Then, in the last round, bidder i’s indiﬀerence relation is predicated on
max{kY[1],Y [2]} = vi (the toughest competitor is like him at this stage). We

















2(vi)=E(max{kY[1],Y [2]}|max{kY[1],Y [2]} = vi)=vi
The upshot is that bidder i should bid kvi in the last round if he won the
ﬁrst and vi if he lost. This is just bidding one’s value in the last round.
More interestingly, consider the ﬁrst round. We note that if i is the “top
dog” and there is someone like i in the pack of rivals, then they each win
one item in equilibrium.11 Hence, optimal bidding by i in the ﬁrst round is
derived from an indiﬀerence between winning the ﬁrst and the second item,
which (using the results already derived) we can write as






1(Y[1]) with Y[1] = vi
]+0 =
just losing ﬁrst and winning second
z }| {
0+[ vi − E(max{kY[1],Y [2]}|Y[1] = vi)]
Thus, in the ﬁrst auction, bidder i should bid what he expects to have to
pay to win the second, if he just loses the ﬁrst. That is, optimal bidding in
the ﬁrst round is captured by
b
1(vi)=E(max{kY[1],Y [2]}|Y[1] = vi)=E(max{kvi,Y [2]}|Y[1] = vi)
In the general case with n bidders, we conclude that bidder i should bid the
expectation of the maximum of k times his strongest rival’s valuation of the
11When strategies are symmetric and increasing, the ﬁrst auction is won if the toughest
rival has a lower valuation, and lost if the toughest rival has a higher valuation. If the
toughest rival has the same valuation as the agent himself, there is a tie, and the winner
of the ﬁrst auction is determined by chance. We argue that the agent must be indiﬀerent
between winning and losing the ﬁrst auction in this case. Assume, to the contrary, that
the agent prefers to win (lose) against an identical, strongest rival. Then, the agent should
bid more (less) aggressively at the outset to win (lose) with probability one (rather than
one half). This implies that the original strategies are not in equilibrium, unless the
indiﬀerence condition is satisﬁed.
7ﬁrst item and his second strongest rival’s valuation of the ﬁrst item predicated
on the strongest rival being identical to himself.
Finally, let us specialize to the two-bidder case. When n =2 , Y[2] is zero
by construction, and the optimal bid of i reduces to
b
1(vi)=E(max{kY[1],Y [2]}|Y[1] = vi)=E(max{kY[1],0}|Y[1] = vi)=kvi
as stated in the proposition above.
Our next result characterizes the expected revenues associated with the
equilibium strategies in Proposition 1.
Lemma 1 In two straight second-price auctions with two bidders, the ex-




















2x(F(x) − F(max{v,kx}))f(x)dx (2)
Proof. In the ﬁrst auction, players bid k times their valuation, and the
price is equal to the lowest bid. Hence, expected revenue is k times the
expected value of the second highest valuation, which is just (1).
In the second auction there are two possible outcomes, depending on
whether the same or diﬀerent bidders win the two objects. The ﬁrst term
in (2) captures the possibility that the winner of the ﬁrst object is also the
winner of the second. Since the loser of the ﬁrst auction bids his valuation, x
say, and the winner bids k times her valuation, the price is precisely x when
one player has valuation x and the other has a valuation that exceeds x/k.
However, it is also possible that the runner up in the ﬁrst auction becomes
the winner of the second, and this is the second term in (2). If the winner
of the ﬁrst auction has valuation x, her bid will be kx in the second auction.
Hence, the price is kx in the second auction when one agent has type x,a n d
the other agent has a type that is lower than x,y e ts u ﬃciently high that the
bid submitted by this player exceeds kx.
8From this we note that ERSSP
1 → 0 and ERSSP
2 → 0 as k → 0.T h i s ,
however, is just a special version of Weber’s (1983) result that a sequence of
second-price (or English) auctions where bidders have unit demands yields
the same expected revenue to all sellers. With only two bidders and two
items for sale, the equilibrium revenue is zero to both sellers. It is impossible
to extract rent from buyers when there is no excess demand, recalling our
assumption of no reserve prices.12
Similarly, we note that ERSSP
1 →
R v




v 2x(1 − F(x))f(x)dx = E(v[2]) as k → 1. E(v[2]) is just the
expectation of the lowest of the two independent randoms draws from F(v).
When k =1 , individual demands are horizontal, and the behavior in the
second auction is independent of the outcome of the ﬁrst auction. The high
valuation bidder will win both objects at a price of v[2], and revenue is the
same in both auctions.
Example: The uniform case (v ∈ [0,1])
To give a ﬂavor of the results, let us consider the uniform case with
v ∈ [0,1],t h a ti s ,v =0and v =1 .T h u s ,f(v)=1and F(v)=v.I nt h i s



































We plot these expected revenues against k in Fig. 1, where ERSSP
2 is the
heavy line, while ERSSP
1 is thin.
12Our general argument above for the n bidder case captures further aspects of Weber’s
results. With k =0 , bidding in both the ﬁrst and the second auction is ultimately based
purely on the expected second highest value among a bidder’s rivals, thus, on the third
order statistic v[3] of the n random valuations. From this it follows that expected revenue
is the same in the two auctions when k =0(unit demands).










Fig. 1: Two straight second-price auctions






2−k, is illustrated in Fig. 2. Note the discontinuity at
k =0 .W h e nk =0 , both sellers earn nothing, that is, the same. However,
when k is small, but strictly positive, we observe that the winner of the ﬁrst
auction is very unlikely also to be the winner of the second auction. Hence,
the expected revenue in the ﬁrst auction is k times (the expected value of)
the second highest valuation, while the expected reveue in the second auction
is approximately k times (the expected value of) the highest valuation. For
the uniform case considered here, the ratio between the expected value of the
highest (2/3) and the expected value of the second highest valuation (1/3)
is exactly 1/2.










Fig. 2: The revenue-ratio in two SSP auctions
10From this example it is immediate that the diﬀerence in expected revenues
is signiﬁcant unless k is close to one (demands are near-horizontal). For
example, if k = 2




27, and it follows that the
(expected) ﬁrst-auction revenue is only 75% of the second-auction revenue.
(End of example)
Given the increasing path of revenues over two straight second-price auc-
tions, it is clear that the ﬁrst of two independent sellers has an incentive to
change the auction format.13 In this paper we shall ﬁrst restrict attention to
the possible role of a buy-out price in the ﬁrst auction when two independent
sellers are selling identical objects. The ﬁrst seller is interested in shifting
revenues from the second to the ﬁrst auction, while we shall also be inter-
ested in the consequences for eﬃciency and total revenue when the buy-out
price is set optimally by the ﬁrst seller. Subsequently, we turn to the case
where there is a single seller who attempts to sell two identical objects in
a sequence of auctions. Absent discounting (impatience), this seller is only
interested in total expected revenue from the two auctions, while he is indif-
ferent as to whether renenues are increasing or decreasing over the sequence.
We show, however, that a suitably chosen buy-out price in the second auc-
tion, depending on the outcome of the ﬁrst auction, can increase the total
expected revenue of a single seller at the potential expense of eﬃciency.
To ease the exposition, we make the following assumption in the remain-
der of the paper.
Assumption 1. kv>v
Essentially, this means that ap r i o r ithere is uncertainty as to whether
an eﬃcient mechanism would allocate both objects to the same buyer or one
object to each potential buyer. Hence, it is entirely possible that bidder
i’s valuation of a second object exceeds bidder j’s valuation the ﬁrst object,
kvi >v j. Economically, this is the most interesting and challenging case. We
could alternatively refer to this as the case with overlap.I nt h ea l t e r n a t i v e ,
non-overlap case, kv<v ,a n ye ﬃcient mechanism would allocate one object
to each potential buyer. In this case, a bidder who has already won one
13That is, short of moving to the last spot if possible. If selling-time is an endogenous
variable, the two symmetric sellers might conceivably be involved in a war of attrition to
become the last seller. This, however, is not the topic of this paper, and seller positions
in the auction sequence are assumed to be exogenous.
11object ceases to be an eﬀective competitor for the second.14


















2x(F(x) − F(kx))f(x)dx (3)
Below, two types of ineﬃciency will be identiﬁed. First, a mechanism may
allocate one object to a bidder who would have received no object in an
eﬃcient mechanism. As we shall see this will be a feature of the mechanism
for the case with two independent sellers where the ﬁrst seller sets an optimal
buy-out price. Likewise, a mechanism may allocate both objects to a bidder
who would only have received one object in an eﬃcient mechanism. This
will arise in the case where a single seller sets a buy-out price in the second
auction which depends on the outcome of the ﬁrst auction.
3 Competing Sellers
We now turn to the case where two diﬀerent sellers each own one object
initially. We assume that the two objects are oﬀered sequentially, and that
there are two potential buyers on the market. We allow the ﬁrst seller to
stipulate a buy-out price of the eBay-variety (Buy It Now) and, thus, consider
the following augmented game:
1 Seller 1 announces a buy-out price, B. At this stage bidders can submit
ab i do fB or refrain from bidding. The object is sold at the price B if
at least one bidder bids B.I fb o t hb i d d e r sb i dB, one bidder is picked
at random to win. If no one bids B, a normal second-price auction is
staged. The price can exceed B in this event.
2 Seller 2 auctions oﬀ the second item, using a second-price auction.
14Thus, Assumption 1 is pretty innocuous. However, it allows us to economize on
notation in the formal analysis below. For completeness, we have included Appendix B,
which shows that all the results in Section 3 below hold with minor modiﬁcations when
Assumption 1 is not met. The interested reader should consult Appendix B when the
results in Section 3 have been derived.
12Thus, in stage 1 of this game, the bidders ﬁrst have to decide whether to
take the buy-out price B or leave it. If one or more bidders take the buy-out
price, the ﬁrst auction ends, and the winner pays B. If no one takes the
buy-out price, the ﬁrst stage continues to a standard second-price auction.
The second stage simply consists of a standard second-price auction.
We ﬁrst derive the relationship between the level of B and the valuations
of bidders who will take this buy-out price. Then we look at the relationship
between the buy-out price and the expected revenues to the two sellers, in-
cluding how they are ranked. Finally, we determine the optimal buy-out price
for the ﬁrst seller. Recall that Assumption 1 is assumed to hold throughout.
3.1 General results
We will look for a symmetric equilibrium in this augmented game in which
bidders with valuations above some level b v take the buy-out price B in stage
1, while bidders with valuations below b v do not. In the augmented game, it is
clear that if no bidder takes B, then it is common knowledge in equilibrium
that both bidders have a type below b v. That is, beliefs are symmetric, and the
logic of Proposition 1 (Black and de Meza (1992)) applies to the remainder
of stage 1 and to stage 2. Hence, in stage 1 bids will be kvi,w h e r evi < b v,
i =1 ,2. Further, regardless of how the good is sold in stage 1, it is well
known that the bid in stage 2 will be kvi if bidder i won the ﬁrst auction,
and vi otherwise. In the following we suppress the subscript when this can
be done without confusion.
In the equilibrium of the augmented game, a given value of B will induce
as e t[b v,v] of bidder types to take the buy-out price B in stage 1. Changing
B will change b v. Hence, we can determine which b v to target, and chose B
accordingly. Thus, we write B(b v) as the value of B that induces bidder types
above b v to take B in a symmetric equilibrium. This allows us to state the
following result.
Proposition 2 Let m(b v)=m i n {v, b v
k},a n dl e tB(b v) be deﬁned by







Then, it is an equilibrium for bidders with v ∈ [b v,v] to bid B(b v) in stage 1
and for bidders with v ∈ [v,b v) not to.
13Proof. See Appendix A.
It is easily seen that B(v)=kE(v). In addition, B(·) may not be
monotonic, implying that for a given value of B, there could be multiple
symmetric equilibria. As shown next, for any distribution and k ∈ (0,1),
the ﬁrst seller can strictly increase his revenue by oﬀering a buy price that
will be accepted with positive probability. But ﬁrst, we return brieﬂyt ot h e
example.
Example: The uniform case (v ∈ [0,1])
To provide some perspective on the relationship between the buy-out
price, B, and the critical valuation, b v,l e tu sﬁrst reconsider the example
above. In this case (4) can be written as






























(1 + b v2) − (1 − b v
k)2¢
b v ≤ k
From this we note that B(b v) < k
2, so that whatever cut-oﬀ valuation b v ∈
[v,v]=[ 0 ,1] we try to implement, the implied buy-out price will always be
less than k times the unconditional expectation of the value of the ﬁrst unit
won. In the special case referred to above where k = 2




3(1+b v) b v ≥ 2
3
(12−5b v)b v
12(1+b v) b v ≤ 2
3
Hence, if we want to implement a cut-oﬀ valuation of b v = 3
4 > 2
3 = k,t h e




















Similarly, if we want to implement a cut-oﬀ valuation of b v = 1
2 < 2
3 = k,t h e


























Returning to the general case, we can state the following result on the
expected revenues in the two stages given some B(b v).
Proposition 3 The expected revenue in the ﬁrst auction is












2x(1 − F(x))f(x)dx (5)





























Proof. For (5) see below, and for (6) see below and Appendix A.
We sketch the main arguments. First, consider the expected revenues in
the ﬁrst auction. When at least one of the bidders has a valuation of at least
b v, the buy-out price is taken and the ﬁrst seller receives B(b v). This event has
a probability 1−F 2(b v). In contrast, if both bidders have valuations less than
b v (i.e., max{vi,v j} < b v), the buy-out price is not taken, and the ﬁrst stage
continues to a second-price auction where each bidder bids kvi according to
Proposition 1. Thus, the ﬁrst seller receives k times min{vi,v j}.T h i se v e n t
has a probability F2(b v). We conclude that the expected revenue to the ﬁrst
seller given B(b v) c a nb ew r i t t e na s
ER1(b v)=( 1−F
2(b v))×B(b v)+F
2(b v)×kE(min{vi,v j}|max{vi,v j} < b v)
15However, E(min{vi,v j}|max{vi,v j} < b v) is just the expected value of the
second-order statistic, v[2], given that the ﬁrst-order statistic, v[1],i sl e s s
than b v. Denote the density of v[2] given v[1] < b v by h∗(v).T h e n h∗(v)=
2f(v)(F(b v)−F(v))
F 2(b v) and we can write










2v(F(b v) − F(v))f(v)dv
Hence, expected revenue in the ﬁrst auction given B(b v) (or simply b v)c a nb e
written as
ER1(b v)=( 1 − F
2(b v)) × B(b v)+k
Z b v
v
2v(F(b v) − F(v))f(v)dv
=[ B(b v)(1 + F(b v))](1 − F(b v)) + k
Z b v
v
2v(F(b v) − F(v))f(v)dv
Inserting B(b v)(1 + F(b v)) from Proposition 1, we can write this as (5).
The derivation of the expected revenue in the second auction is slightly
more complicated, and we relegate the formal derivation of (6) to Appendix
A. However, in the second auction, the object will be bought either by the
winner of the ﬁr s ta u c t i o n ,o rb yt h el o s e r .
The ﬁrst and second term in (6) capture revenue in the former case.
Assuming that the loser of stage 1 has valuation x, and bids x in stage 2, he
will lose the second auction if the other bidder’s bid exceeds x, which requires
that the rival has a valuation which is at least x/k.T h eﬁrst term in (6) then
accounts for the possibility that one bidder has a valuation below b v (and thus
does not accept B)a n da l s ob e l o wv/k (implying the existence of a bidder
type which has a higher marginal revenue on both units), and that the other
bidder has a very high valuation, allowing him to win both auctions. The
second term in (6) describes the case where both bidders accepted B,b u t
that the (random) loser has a valuation which is low relative to the winner.
This exhausts the possibilities that the winner is the same in both stages.
The remaining terms in (6) are relevant if the winner of stage 1 loses stage
2. Assuming this bidder has a valuation of x, say, the price in the second
auction will then be equal to the bid from this bidder, namely kx.T h ethird
term in (6) is for cases where the winner of stage 1 did not accept the buy-out
16price, and where the other bidder (who must have a lower valuation) submits
ab i dh i g h e rt h a nkx in stage 2. The fourth t e r mi n( 6 )i sr e l e v a n tw h e nt h e
winner of the ﬁrst auction bid B, but was the only one to do so. Furthermore,
the ﬁfth term in (6) is for cases where both bidders bid B, but where the
(random) winner of stage 1 loses stage 2 because his valuation is so small
that he is certain to lose stage two given the fact that the other bidder has
a valuation higher than b v. Finally, the sixth term in (6) applies when both
bidders bid B, and the (random) winner of stage 1 has a valuation which is
low relative to the loser, allowing the latter to win stage 2. This exhausts
the possibilities that the loser of stage 1 wins stage 2.
Example: The uniform case (v ∈ [0,1])




6 (3 − 3b v +3 b v2 − b v3) b v ≥ k
1




6 (3 − 2k +3 b v − 3b v2 + b v3) b v ≥ k
1
6k ((3 − k)k2 +3 k(1 − k)b v2 − (1 − k2)b v3) b v ≤ k
For the special case considered above, where k = 2
3, the expected revenues
c a nb ew r i t t e na s
ER1(b v)=
½ 1
9 (3 − 3b v +3 b v2 − b v3) b v ≥ 2
3
1





27 (5 + 9b v − 9b v2 +3 b v3) b v ≥ 2
3
1
108 (28 + 18b v2 − 15b v3) b v ≤ 2
3
Hence, if the buy-out price has been chosen to implement the cut-oﬀ valuation
b v = 3
4 > 2
3 = k,t h a ti s ,B ≈ 0.3, the expected revenues are ER1(3
4)=
43
192 ≈ 0.22 and ER2(3
4)= 509






Similarly, if the buy-out price has been chosen to implement the cut-oﬀ
valuation b v = 1
2 < 2
3 = k,t h a ti sB ≈ 0.26, the expected revenues are
ER1(1
2)= 65
288 ≈ 0.23 and ER2(1
2)=245







17When pitted against the ﬁrst auction revenues in two straight second-price
auctions, we notice how the ﬁrst seller can raise his revenue by introducing a
buy-out price. In the next subsection we determine the optimal level of the
cut-oﬀ valuation and, hence, the buy-out price to see when the buy-out price
can have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the revenues. (End of example)
To end this subsection we can state two more results.
Lemma 2 (Monotonicity) (i) ER2(b v) is strictly increasing for b v ∈ [v,v).
(ii) ER1(b v)+ER2(b v) is strictly increasing for b v ∈ [v,kv), and constant for
b v ∈ [kv,v].
Proof. See Appendix A.
The fact that ER2(b v) is increasing can easily be understood by the fol-
lowing two observations. First, if the ﬁrst auction is won by the bidder with
the lowest valuation (because both bidders bid the buy-out price B,a n d
the low-valuation bidder is randomly picked as winner of the ﬁrst object),
the revenue to the second seller will be very low, indeed, namely k times
the second highest valuation. Secondly, the larger the cut-oﬀ valuation b v,
the lower is the probability that the ﬁrst auction is won by the bidder with
the lowest valuation. Hence, as b v increases, it becomes increasingly unlikely
that the buy-out price in ﬁrst auction changes the identity of its winner and,
therefore, the price in the second auction.
The second part of (ii) in Lemma 2 can be explained by appeal to the
Revenue Equivalence Theorem, which states that two mechanisms that result
in the same allocation must also give rise to the same overall revenue.15 Now,
the buy-out price changes the identity of the winner of the ﬁrst auction only
if both bidders accept the buy-out price and the random winner happens to
be the low-valuation bidder. Assuming they both accept the buy-out price,
we note that if the buy-out price is such that b v ∈ [kv,v],t h e( r a n d o m )
loser of the ﬁrst auction must necessarily win the second. To see this, we
note that the valuation of the ﬁrst-auction loser and, hence, his bid in the
second auction must be at least b v. This, in turn, exceeds the rival bid in
the second auction which is at most kv. Thus, when both bidders have
valuations above b v,w i t hb v ∈ [kv,v], each bidder will win precisely one unit.
However, the same is true if there is no buy-out price. If both bidder have
valuations in the interval [kv,v], the bidder with the highest valuation wins
15See e.g. Klemperer (1999).
18the ﬁrst auction, and the other bidder wins the second. In conclusion, when
b v ∈ [kv,v] the buy-out price might change the order in which bidders win,
but not the ﬁnal allocation. Consequently, overall revenue is the same with
and without a buy-out price.
In contrast, for low values of b v, b v ∈ [v,kv), the presence of a buy-out
price might change the ﬁnal allocation and therefore also overall revenue. In
the next subsection we discuss the consequences of this in greater detail.
Proposition 4 (Increasing prices) ER2(b v) >E R 1(b v), ∀b v ∈ [v,v].
Proof. See Appendix A.
As remarked in relation to Proposition 1 (Black and de Meza), revenue is
strictly increasing over the auction sequence when there is no buy-out price.
Indeed, revenue increases with probability one in the case without a buy-out
price. However, the result in Proposition 4 is only for expected revenues. It
is entirely possible that actual, observed revenues decrease when there is a
strictly positive buy-out price. For example, if one bidder has a valuation
b v>0 and the other v =0 , revenue in stage 1 is B(b v) > 0, while revenue in
stage 2 is 0. The upshot of Proposition 4 is that the ﬁrst seller can increase
expected revenue by introducing a buy-out price, but will not be able “to
level the playing ﬁeld”.
3.2 The optimal buy-out price
Now, we move on to determine the optimal buy-out price from the perspective
of the ﬁrst seller. Our main result can be stated as follows.
Proposition 5 (i) For k<1 the optimal value of b v is strictly lower than
kv. Consequently, the sequence of auctions is ineﬃcient when the ﬁrst seller
chooses the buy-out price optimally. (ii) For k =1 , b v = v is optimal.
Proof. See Appendix A.
This result follows more or less directly from Lemma 2. Since the sum
of revenues is the same for all b v ∈ [kv,v], and revenue to the second seller
is globally, strictly increasing, it follows that b v = kv dominates all higher
cut-oﬀ values from the perspective of the ﬁrst seller. Further, at b v = kv
the derivative of ER1(b v) is strictly negative, and it always pays for the ﬁrst
19seller to lower the cut-oﬀ valuation below b v by a suitable choice of the buy-
out price B. The consequences for eﬃciency are immediate: It pays for
the ﬁrst seller to set the buy-out price, B, at such a level that the ﬁnal
allocation is ineﬃcient with strictly positive probability. The optimal ﬁrst-
auction buy-out price is set such that the low-valuation bidder wins the ﬁrst
object with positive probability when he would have won no object in an
eﬃcient mechanism.
In the special case where k =1 , the behavior in the second auction
is independent of the outcome of the ﬁrst auction. Therefore, stage 1 is
essentially equivalent to a one-shot auction. Thus, the last part of Proposition
5 shows that buy-out prices lower revenue in such auctions when buyers are
risk neutral.16
Example: The uniform case (v ∈ [0,1])
To provide some perspective on the last proposition, we reconsider the
uniform case. From Proposition 5 we know that b v<k v = k,f o ra n yk ∈






3 − 3(1 + 2k − k
2)b v
2 +6 kb v)






3 +3 k(1 − k)b v
2 +( 3− k)k
2)
Maximizing ER1(b v) with respect to b v gives the optimal cut-oﬀ valuation from
the perspective of the ﬁrst seller
v
∗ =
1+2 k − k2
3 − k2 −
((1 + 2k − k2)2 − 2k(3 − k2))
1/2
3 − k2 <k= kv














16For speciﬁc distributions, this result has already been noted by Budish and Takeyama
(2001), Mathews (2002) and Reynolds and Wooders (2002). We show that this is a gen-
eral property whenever the distribution function is continuously diﬀerentiable. Thus, the
generality of our argument also reveals that “ironing of marginal revenue” cannot explain
the use of buy-out prices in this case (for more on this, see below).
20We can substitute v∗ into the revenue expressions, and Fig. 3 illustrates how
ER1(v∗) (thin)a n dER2(v∗) (heavy)v a r yw i t hk.









Fig. 3: Revenues in auction with buy-out
The ratio between the expected revenues given an optimally chosen buy-
out price, RR(BO)=
ER1(v∗)
ER2(v∗), is illustrated in the following ﬁgure










Fig. 4: Revenue Ratio in Auction with Buy-out
We can compare with the case of two straight second-price auctions il-
lustrated in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2. In Fig. 5 we merge the information in Fig.
1 and Fig. 3. The dashed lines are for two straight second-price auctions,
while the solid lines are for the case where the ﬁrst seller chooses the buy-out
price to implement v∗.










Fig. 5: Comparison of auction revenues
Fig. 6 merges the information from Fig. 2 and Fig. 4, and the thin line
is for two straight second-price auctions, while the heavy line is associated
with an optimal buy-out price.











Fig. 6: Revenue Ratios
Finally, in Fig. 7 we plot the percentage gain to the ﬁrst seller from
















Fig. 7: Percentage gain from buy-out price
The last three ﬁgures essentially illustrate that the value from the per-
spective of the ﬁrst seller of introducing a buy-out price is substantial when
the individual demand functions are relatively steep (k small). When de-
mands are steep, and there are only two bidders, the competition for the
ﬁrst object will be weak. It follows that the ﬁrst seller has a strong incentive
to try to improve his position in this case by introducing a suitably chosen
buy-out price. The following table captures central features of the example
23in an alternative way.
k ERSSP
1 v∗ B(v∗) ER1(v∗) G(BO)
0.01 0.00333 0.00995 0.00495 0.00495 0.49
0.10 0.03333 0.09549 0.04597 0.04558 0.37
0.25 0.08333 0.22618 0.10623 0.10176 0.22
0.50 0.16667 0.43308 0.20404 0.17931 0.08
0.75 0.25000 0.66667 0.32222 0.25309 0.01
Recall that in this example revenue equivalence and eﬃciency is lost when
b v is set below k = kv. Hence, a comparison of the ﬁrst and third column
is indicative of the ineﬃciency when b v is set optimally. For example, when
k = kv =0 .5 the optimal b v is aproximately 0.43, which implies that there is
a small, but “non-trivial”, probability that the ﬁnal allocation is ineﬃcient.
(End of example)
I nt h en e x ts e c t i o n ,w ea s s u m et h a tt h et w oo b j e c t sa r eo w n e db yasingle
seller and show that a buy-out price in the last auction is beneﬁcial to this
seller. Before proceeding, however, it is of some value to examine more closely
why overall revenue declines when a buy-out price is oﬀered by the ﬁrst of
two sellers.
As mentioned, the Revenue Equivalence Theorem reveals that if two
mechanisms yield the same allocation, expected revenue in the two mech-
anisms must also be the same. Since the outcome of the bench-mark model
is eﬃcient, it follows that introducing a buy-out price changes revenue if and
only if17 the resulting allocation is ineﬃcient.
For instance, introducing a buy-out price in the ﬁrst auction produces the
following kind of ineﬃciency: an agent may win one item when he would have
won none without the buy-out price. In the next section, a buy-out price in
the second auction will be shown to cause another type of ineﬃciency: an
agent may win two units, when he would have won exactly one without a
buy-out price. In the latter case, an agent who would have won one unit in
an eﬃcient auction risks not winning one at all, and in this sense the type of
ineﬃciency studied in the next section is the opposite of that studied in this
section.
17This assumes that an agent of type v is indiﬀerent between the two mechanisms. We
will return to this point momentarily.
24To understand the consequences of these diﬀerent kinds of ineﬃciencies,
it is useful to exploit the similarities between monopoly pricing and auc-
tions18. When a monopolist faces agents with multi-unit demands, it is
well known that the optimal pricing schedule generally involves quantity dis-
counts. These discounts enable the monopolist to sell several units to agents
with high marginal revenue on all units, without at the same time selling to
agents with low marginal revenue on some units. Whether agents have unit
or multi-unit demands, it is well understood that the key ingredient in the
monopolist’s optimization problem is marginal revenue.
Now, the expression for what amounts to marginal revenue of a bidder




for the ﬁrst unit, and it can easily be shown that marginal revenue is kJ(v)
















i(v1,v 2) is the probability that agent i wins at least j units, given
that the two agents are of type v1 and v2, respectively. The last term is the
expected rent obtained by an agent of type v in the mechanism. (7) is the
counterpart of the revenue for a monopolist, who earns the area under the
marginal revenue curve.
Clearly, if EU(v,v) is the same in two diﬀerent mechanisms, and if these
mechanisms implement the same allocation, (i.e., the same q
j
i(v1,v 2)), ex-
pected revenue must be the same. This is the Revenue Equivalence Theorem.
We are now equipped to provide an alternative proof of why overall rev-
enue declines when a buy-out price is optimally chosen by the ﬁrst seller.
18These similarities were ﬁrst pointed out by Bulow and Roberts (1989) for auctions
with unit demand, see also Bulow and Klemperer (1996) and Klemperer (1999). Maskin
and Riley (1989) draw parallels between auctions with multi-unit demand and non-linear
pricing. For more on the latter, see also Kirkegaard (2002).
19For a derivation of J(v), see Myerson (1981) or Bulow and Roberts (1989). Since
willingness-to-pay for a second unit is k times that for the ﬁrst unit, it is unsurprising
that marginal revenue of the second unit is k times marginal revenue of the ﬁrst unit, see
Kirkegaard (2002).
25Given that kv>b v>v , the allocation changes as a consequence of the buy-
o u tp r i c ei ft h ew i n n e ro fs t a g e1w o u l dn o th a v ew o nau n i ta ta l li nt h e
eﬃcient allocation. If the winner of stage 1 has valuation v this happens if
v<k v, and the rival bidder has valuation x ∈ (v









dx − J(v)=v − J(v) > 0
That is, given the event that the allocation has changed, the marginal revenue
lost (which in expectation is the ﬁrst term20) exceeds the marginal revenue
gained. Hence, overall revenue decreases as the ﬁrst term in (7) consequently
declines, and the second term is unchanged. It is not proﬁtable to allow an
agent to win one unit too often, compared to the eﬃcient allocation.
We have already argued that when k =1 , stage 1 is equivalent to a
one-shot auction. In one-shot auctions, revenue is clearly maximized by al-
locating the object to the agent with the highest marginal revenue. When
the agent with the highest valuation is also the agent with the highest J(v),
i.e. when J(v) is increasing in v, this is accomplished with an eﬃcient mech-
anism. However, when J(v) is not monotonic, it is impossible to always give
the object to the agent with the highest marginal revenue. The reason is
that the auctioneer must respect the incentive compatibility constraint when
designing his mechanism. To satisfy this constraint, it is necessary that the
probability of winning the object is non-decreasing in the valuation.
In the cases where J(v) is non-monotonic, the rules of the optimal mech-
anism21 ensures that the probability of winning is constant over a subset of
valuations. That is, agents with diﬀerent valuations have the same proba-
bility of winning, and therefore contributes marginally the same to revenue.
Hence, the optimal mechanism is said to “iron” the marginal revenue curve.
20That this is equal to v can be understood by the following argument. First, if bidder
1 has valuation v and faces bidder 2 with valuation x ∈ (v
k,v), then the exact value of x
does not inﬂuence the allocation in either auction format. Second, imagine the buy-out
price has been introduced, and that bidder 1 won the ﬁrst auction, but it is known that
x ∈ (v
k,v). Third, imagine the seller wants to revert the allocation back to the original
allocation, and he therefore asks bidder 2 to pay an amount, p, to get the good. Whether
or not bidder 2 accepts or rejects, he will win the second auction. Hence, if he accepts
p his marginal gain is kx.T h u s ,i fp = v, bidder 2 is willing to accept p regardless of x.
However, if p>v , there is positive probability that bidder 2 will not accept. Consequently,
the seller can extract precisely v from bidder 2 to ignore the buy-out price.
21See Myerson (1981) or Bulow and Roberts (1989).
26Now, we observe that the buy-out price is a crude way of ironing the marginal
revenue curve, since all agents with valuation above b v has the same proba-
bility of winning in a one-shot auction. It is crude because the interval on
which marginal revenue is ironed in an optimal mechanism is always interior,
whereas the buy-out price also bundles valuations close to and including v
with lower valuations.
Since buy-out prices oﬀer some (excessive) ironing, it is perhaps not ob-
vious whether or not buy-out prices can increase revenue when J(v) is non-
monotonic and k =1 . However, our model is suﬃciently general to encom-
pass these situations, and we can therefore conclude that buy-out prices are
counterproductive even when some ironing is called for, precisely because the
ironing is too crude.22
We conclude, quite generally, that overall revenue is adversely aﬀected by
the buy-out price, if the ineﬃciency is of the form that an agent wins one
unit more often than is eﬃcient. In the next section, however, we show that
it is possible to increase revenue by introducing another form of ineﬃciency.
4 One Seller
In the following, we assume that the same seller owns both objects, and that
they are sold sequentially. Above we established that total revenue decreases
if a buy-out price is oﬀered in the ﬁrst auction, because an undesirable kind of
ineﬃciency was generated. However, in the following we show that a buy-out
price in the second auction produces a diﬀerent type of ineﬃciency, one which
is desirable for the seller. To this end, we consider the following augmented
game:
1T h eﬁrst object is sold using a second-price auction. The closing price
is observed.
2 The seller announces a buy-out price, B, for the second object. The
object is sold at the price B if at least one bidder bids B.I f b o t h
22As an aside, we note that we are not aware of any papers on auctions (or monopoly)
showing that “ironing” may be counterproductive, if it is too crude in the sense of this
paper. Among the related papers the model of Budish and Takeyama (2001) is discrete,
while Reynolds and Wooders (2002) assume uniformly distributed valuations. Ironing
is not an issue in either of these speciﬁcations. Mathews (2002) also assumes uniform
distributions, but he remarks that his results holds for any distribution, though without
r e f e r r i n gt oi r o n i n g .
27bidders bid B, one bidder is picked at random to win. If no one bids
B, a normal second-price auction is staged. The price can exceed B in
this event.
In line with much of the literature on mechanism design, we will accord
the seller a powerful ability to pre-commit to a particular auction design.
To illustrate, suppose the ﬁrst auction is conducted, and the closing price
is observed. Hence, if bidding strategies in the ﬁrst auction are strictly in-
creasing, the valuation of the loser, v, is revealed. Contingent on this v,a
buy-out price for the second auction, B(v), is set. We assume throughout,
and this is where commitment matters, that the relation between v and B,
that is, B(v),i sﬁrmly understood by bidders at the outset. Thus, the seller
can credibly announce B(v) before the ﬁrst auction.23
Given this set-up, our basic argument can be outlined as follows. Assume
that the bidding strategy in the ﬁrst auction is strictly increasing, and that
the closing price, p, is observed. Since the latter is determined by the bidding
strategy of the runner-up, the valuation of this agent, v, can be deduced.
Then, in the second stage, a buy-out price is oﬀered, which is contingent on
v. Assuming that the buy-out price, B,i sc l o s et ov, it is not desirable for
the loser of stage 1 to accept it. However, if B is lower than v, the winner
of stage 1 will accept it, if his willingness-to-pay exceeds the buy-out price.
The reason is that if he does not, a second-price auction ensues, in which he
knows the loser of stage 1 will be willing to compete for the object until the
price reaches v>B . Consequently, the winner of stage 1 also wins stage 2
if his valuation is at least B, although he would win less often in an eﬃcient
auction, namely when his valuation is above v.
To see why this might increase revenue, observe that it is common for a
monopolist to oﬀer quantity discounts. These discounts introduce the same
kind of ineﬃciency as that described above. If p is the price of one unit and
p+B the price of two units, an agent may be willing to pay more than B for
one unit, but less than p. In this case, he will obviously buy nothing. On the
other hand, a buyer willing to pay at least p for one unit and an additional
B for a second unit will purchase two units. Clearly, it would be eﬃcient
for these two buyers to share the two units. By introducing the ineﬃciency,
however, the monopolist is able to sell to the agent with highest marginal
revenue on the incremental unit.
23For more on this, see below.
28To close the argument, we need to understand why this kind of ineﬃ-
ciency favors agents with high marginal revenue. The ﬁrst observation is
that kJ(v) >J(kv), implying that the agent with the highest possible valua-
tion should win two units, even when faced with a competitor with valuation
slightly higher than kv, and even though this is ineﬃcient.
Hence, ineﬃciency “at the top” is always desirable from the point of
view of revenue generation. Often, however, ineﬃciency is also desirable
at all other levels. Assume for the rest of the section that the following
monotonicity condition is satisﬁed.
Assumption 2.
1−F(v)
f(v) is decreasing in v.
This increasing hazard rate24 condition implies (but is not implied by)
an increasing J(·) function (i.e., decreasing marginal revenues in the more








such that a bidder with valuation v s h o u l dw i nt w ou n i t sw h e nf a c e db ya
rival with a valuation in a neighborhood of kv.
Thus, the seller would like to design an auction such that a bidder with
valuation v ∈ [
v
k,v] wins two units when faced by a rival with valuation close
to kv, i.e. he wins two units more often than is eﬃcient. As argued in the
beginning of this section, this can be accomplished by using a buy-out price
in the second auction.
To elaborate, if v is the revealed valuation of the stage 1 loser, we consider
a commonly known function B(v) which gives the resulting buy-out price in
stage 2. That is, B(v) is known before the ﬁrst auction commences. The
buy-out price is assumed to satisfy B(v) ≤ v for all v. We will then look for
a discriminating equilibrium, deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 A discriminating equilibrium consists of a symmetric bidding
strategy in stage 1, which is strictly increasing in bidder valuation, and the
following strategy in stage 2. Given that B(v) is the buy-out price in stage 2,
the winner of stage 1 bids B(v) in stage 2 if and only if his marginal utility
24The hazard rate is h(v)=
f(v)
1−F(v). An increasing hazard rate is equivalent to log-
concavity of 1 − F(v) . See Bagnoli and Bergstrom (1989) for an extensive treatment of
log-concave distributions.
29of the second unit exceeds B(v), while the loser of stage 1 never bids B(v).
Bidder i, i =1 ,2, bids his marginal utility in stage 2, if the buy-out price
was not accepted by anyone.
Inspection of Deﬁnition 1 reveals that the existence of a discriminating
equilibrium necessitates that v > 0.T os e et h i s ,a s s u m et ot h ec o n t r a r yt h a t
v =0 , and consider the incentives of a bidder with a valuation slightly above
0. By following the equilibrium strategy, it is very unlikely that such a bidder
will win either auction. Rather, it is preferable for such an agent to bid 0 in
the ﬁrst auction, and then accept the buy-out price (of zero) in the second
auction. Since the competing agent will also want to buy the good in the
second auction at the buy-out price, the low-valuation agent wins the second
auction with a signiﬁcant probability of 0.5
On the other hand, if v > 0 and B(v) is close to v, an agent with a
valuation close to v prefers not to accept B if he lost stage 1, even if he
deviated in the ﬁrst auction. The reason is that there is a mass of types for
which kv < B, implying that the low valuation agent wins the second auction
with signiﬁcant probability and pays signiﬁcantly less than his own valuation
when following the equilibrium strategy. This is preferable to accepting the
buy-out price and winning with an even larger probability, provided that the
buy-out price is large relative to the valuation.
These arguments capture the key qualitative diﬀerence between cases with
v =0and v > 0.W h e nv =0 , a bidder with valuation v does not contribute
to the competition for any of the units since v <k v , ∀v>v .25 In contrast,
when v > 0, even a bidder with the lowest possible valuation, v, contributes
to the competition, since there is a range of v such that kv < v.26
If the ﬁrst auction was won by bidder 1, say, the winner of the second stage
changes as a consequence of the buy-out price if and only if B(v2) <k v 1 <v 2.
In this case, bidder 1 also wins the second item, resulting in the desired
ineﬃciency. The seller seeks to construct a B(v) function which has the
following properties.
Assumption 3. Deﬁne B(v) on [v,v], and assume that
25A bidder with valuation v could never be expected to win even in the competition for
the second item. This is easily checked against the results of Section 2.
26In this case, a bidder with valuation v could reasonably win the second unit. Again,
this can easily be checked against Section 2.
30(i) B(v) ∈ (kv,v), ∀v ∈ (v,kv), B(v)=v otherwise27. B(v) is everywhere
continuous, and it is continuously diﬀerentiable with 0 <B 0(v) < ∞,
∀v ∈ [v,v]\{kv}
(ii) kJ(x) >J(v), ∀x ≥ 1
kB(v)
(iii) The function b(v) is strictly increasing28,w h e r e
b(v)=
(





kB0(v) for v ∈ [v,kv)
kv for v ∈ [kv,v]
We will show below that the function b(v) is the bidding strategy in stage
1 of a discriminating equilibrium. If the loser of stage 1 is revealed to be of
type v ∈ [v,kv), the buy-out price in stage 2 is B(v) <k v, and it is accepted
with strictly positive probability. However, if the loser is of a higher type,
B(v) exceeds kv, and there is therefore zero probability that the winner of
stage 1 accepts it. Note that the ability to precommit to the auction design
is formally important, as the design is not time consistent. Once stage 2 is
reached, it is no longer in the seller’s interest to oﬀer the buy-out price, since
this will decrease revenue in stage 2.
Before stating the result of this section, we observe that the second term
of (7) is unchanged. This is because a bidder with valuation v will lose stage
1 in both auction formats, and since B(v)=v the presence of the buy-
out price in stage 2 will not aﬀect the probability of such a bidder winning
(which will be F(
v
k)) or the price paid in that event29. Furthermore, while we
argued that ineﬃciency at the top is always desirable, we explicitly assumed
that B(kv)=kv, implying that there is no ineﬃciency at the top. This
part of Assumption 3 is made solely to simplify the proof of the following
Proposition.
Proposition 6 (i) Any discriminating equilibrium satisfying Assumption 3
is strictly revenue superior to the equilibrium of a sequence of second-price
27If the agent who loses stage 1 deviated to an action that is not played by any type in
equilibrium, this is taken to signal that v = v.
28b(v) is continuous, given part (i) of Assumption 3.
29In fact, this is why this assumption has been imposed. We could let B(v) <v ,w h i c h
would decrease the second term in (7) and hence increase revenue further. However, we
seek the stronger result that it is the change in allocation (i.e. the ineﬃciency) that drives
revenue up. Thus, we keep the second term the same over the two auction formats.
31auctions with no buy-out price. (ii) A discriminating equilibrium satisfying
Assumption 3 exists whenever v ≥ kE(v). In such an equilibrium, the bidding
strategy in stage 1 is given by b(v).
Proof. (i) T h ep r o o fi sb a s e do ni n s p e c t i o no f( 7 ) .A sm e n t i o n e da b o v e ,
the second term is unchanged. However, the ﬁrst term in (7) is higher when
the buy-out price is introduced. To see this, observe that if the allocation
changes, the winner of stage 1 must have a type that exceeds B
k.B y t h e
second part of Assumption 3, the marginal revenue of the second unit to this
bidder is higher than the marginal revenue of the ﬁrst unit to the losing bid-
der. Hence, for every realization of (v1,v 2), the term inside the expectations
operator in (7) is no lower, but possible higher, than without the buy price.
For a proof of the second part of the proposition, see Appendix A.
The condition in the second part of Proposition 6 is required to eliminate
any incentive to bid low in stage 1, and then bid B in stage 2 if stage 1 was
lost. As can be seen by the second part of the Proposition, the presence of a
buy-out price in stage two increases bids in stage 1, since b(v) ≥ kv.T h u s ,
revenue in stage 1 increases. The sum of revenues in the two stages also
increases, despite the fact that revenue in stage 2 decreases.
We also observe that Assumption 1 implies that k is not too small, while
the condition in (ii) of the proposition implies that k i sn o tt o og r e a te i t h e r ,







.30 As an example, the assumptions are satisﬁed for the
uniform distribution on [1,2] with k ∈ (1
2, 2
3).
Finally, we note that the conclusion that a discriminating auction (second-
round buy-out) may increase overall revenue of the seller is related to a
further result in Black and de Meza (1992). They show, by an example, that
an option oﬀered to the ﬁrst-round winner of buying the second object at the
ﬁrst-round price may increase overall revenue above the level of two straight
second-price auctions. Despite the one-sided nature of the option suggested
by Black and de Meza it, presumably, trades on the same type of ineﬃciency
as in this section. That is, the winner of the ﬁrst round wins more often than
is eﬃcient.
30Note that these are suﬃcient conditions.
325C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this paper we sought to explain the use of buy-out prices by observing
that online auction markets are dynamic, with players knowing that goods
not presently on the market are likely to be oﬀered in the future. It was
shown that there is an incentive for current sellers to oﬀer a buy-out price
that is accepted with positive probability. Furthermore, we showed that
a sophisticated seller with several units can increase the sum of revenues
by introducing a buy-out price in later auctions which is contingent on the
outcome of earlier auctions.
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34Appendix A
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . Consider a bidder with valuation v ≥ b v.B y


























where the ﬁve terms capture all the possible outcomes as follows. First,t h e
bidder wins stage 1 at a price of B with probability one, if the competitor
refrains from accepting B, i.e. has valuation below b v. Second,w i t hp r o b a -
bility one, the bidder wins stage 2 at a price equal to the valuation of his
rival, if this rival did not accept B in stage 1(she has a valuation below b v),
and if her bid, or valuation, (which exceeds v)i sa tm o s tkv. Third,t h e
ﬁrst auction is won with probability 0.5 if the opponent also bids B, i.e. if
she has a valuation above b v. Fourth, if the player lost stage 1 because the
other player also bid B, the second stage is won at a price equal to the rival’s
bid if this bid is not too high. Finally,i fb o t hp l a y e r sb i dB in stage 1 and
the player in question won, we deduce that the competitor’s valuation is at
least b v, implying that the second auction is also won if the rival’s valuation is
nevertheless so low that the winner of stage 1 will submit a higher bid than
the loser.
If the bidder, instead, does not bid B,t h eﬁrst unit will be sold at a
second-price auction, if the buy-out price is not accepted by the rival either.
The best response in this subgame is easily shown to be to outbid the other
bidder (the bidder in question is willing to bid kv, whereas the other bidder
is known to be willing to bid at most kb v,i fs h ed i dn o tb i dB right away).













35Letting B(b v) be the buy-out price at which type b v is indiﬀerent between
































} − F(b v)
´
+ k (F(max{b v,kv}) − F(b v))
i
≥ 0
Since EU(B,b v)−EU(NB,b v)=0by construction, it follows that EU(B,v)−
EU(NB,v) ≥ 0 for all v ≥ b v. Hence, players with high valuations have no
incentive to deviate from the equilibrium strategy.
For agents of type v<b v, the equilibrium strategy of not bidding B


























































(v − kx)f(x)dx (9)
36and that this is equal to the negative of (8) when v = b v, i.e. the expression














implying that EU(NB,v)−EU(B,v) > 0 for all v<b v.T h u s ,l o wv a l u a t i o n
bidders have no incentive to deviate either. This completes the proof of
Proposition 2.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . If EP2(v|b v) denotes the expected payment
in stage 2 of a bidder with valuation v when the cut-oﬀ valuation is b v,t h e































































37The next step is to change the order of integration of each of the ﬁve








is obviously zero if v ≥ kb v. Otherwise, it is straightforward to change the














































































































kxf(x)(F(b v) − F(max{v,kx}))dx




























































Summing and rearranging the ﬁve terms and noting that min{b v,kv} = km(b v)
produce (6). This ends the proof of Proposition 3.
39Proof of Lemma 2. (i) The function m(b v) is diﬀerentiable everywhere
except at b v = kv. Hence, for all b v 6= kv, the derivative of (6) is
ER
0





kxf(x)dxf(b v) − kb vf(b v)(1 − F(b v))
+2km(b v)f(m(b v))(F(b v) − F(km(b v)))m
0(b v)

















b v k(x − b v)f(x)dx b v>k v
(10)
which is strictly positive for all b v<v. Note also that when b v converges to kv,
ER0
2(b v) converges to the same from the left and the right. That is, ER0
2(b v)
is continuously diﬀerentiable, and strictly increasing.
(ii) Again, the function m(b v) is diﬀerentiable everywhere except at b v =










+(1 − F(b v))(1 − F(m(b v)) + kb vf(b v))
+(1 − F(b v))f(m(b v))m
0(b v)(km(b v) − b v)






k(x − b v)f(x)dx
−f(b v)(1 − F(m(b v)))
µ
b v −

























b v k(x−b v)f(x)dx b v> kv
(11)
40As before, when b v converges to kv, ER0
1(b v) converges to the same from the left
and from the right, and it follows that ER1(b v) is continuously diﬀerentiable.








kb v))(1 − F(b v)) > 0 b v<k v
0 b v ≥ kv
This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
Proof of Proposition 4. Assuming that b v<k v, (5) and (6) imply


































Alternatively, we can write this as








































0(b v)=2 f(b v)
Ã











2(b v) > 0
we conclude that A(b v) > 0, for all b v ∈ (v,kv].F u r t h e r m o r e ,B(kv)=0and
B







2(b v)) < 0
implies that B(b v) > 0, for all b v ∈ [v,kv). It follows that ER2(b v)−ER1(b v) >
0, for all b v ∈ [v,kv]. Finally, Lemma 2 ensures that ER2(b v) − ER1(b v) > 0
on b v ∈ (kv,v] as well, since ER2(b v) increases and ER1(b v) decreases on this
interval. This ends the proof of Proposition 4.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 . In the proof of Lemma 2 it was established






k(x − b v)f(x)dx, for b v ∈ [kv,v]
Clearly, this is negative, and strictly so for all b v ∈ [kv,v). It follows that the
optimal value of b v must be strictly lower than kv. The sequence of auctions is
ineﬃcient since a bidder with valuation b v<k v faced by a rival with valuation
v wins stage 1 with probability 0.5. The eﬃcient outcome in this case is for
the bidder with valuation v to win both.
However, when k =1 , (11) reduces to (1 − F(b v))2 ≥ 0. It follows that
when k =1 , the optimal value of b v is v. This completes the proof of Propo-
sition 5.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 . To prove the second part of Proposition 6,
we start with the following preliminary remarks.
(i) First observe that the assumption v ≥ kE(v) implies
Z v
z
(z − kx)f(x)dx ≥ 0, ∀z ∈ [v,kv] (12)
To see this, note that the derivative with respect to z is
f(z)
·




42where the term is square brackets is decreasing in z (by Assumption 2).
Hence, once the slope of (12) becomes negative, it remains negative. Conse-
quently, (12) is minimized at one of the end-points. Clearly, (12) is positive
at z = kv,a n dv ≥ kE(v) ensures that it is non-negative at v.
(ii) It is easily seen to be a dominant strategy to bid marginal utility
in stage 2, if the buy-out price was not accepted. Consider a bidder with
valution z, who played his equilibrium strategy in stage 1, but lost. Then,















In other words, the bidder should prefer rejecting the buy-out price to ac-
cepting it. Notice that the right-hand-side can be made arbitrarily small
(and the left-hand-side strictly positive) by letting B(z) → z,i m p l y i n gt h a t
there exists B(·) functions such that (13) is indeed satisﬁed.
(iii) Let b(v) be the candidate for the equilibrium bidding strategy in
stage 1, and assume it is strictly increasing. Since the buy-out price is at
least v,i ti sc o n v e n i e n tt od e ﬁne B−1(x)=v if x ≤ v. Then, if a bidder with


























The ﬁrst term adresses the possibility that the ﬁrst auction is won. If the
bidder won stage 1, it is optimal to accept the buy-out price in stage 2 if and
only if it is lower than kv, and this is the second term. However, if stage
1 is lost, the bidder may or may not prefer rejecting B(z) to accepting it.
Given that the rival follows the equilibrium strategy, this is captured by the
third term. We can now show why it is necessary that b(v) takes the form
d e s c r i b e di nA s s u m p t i o n3 .
Consider ﬁrst v<k v, and examine the properties of (14) for z close to v.













The ﬁrst order condition is then satisﬁed if and only if b(v) is as stated in
Assumption 3. Observe that as B(v) −→ v, b(v) −→ kv.
When v,z > kv, B(z)=z, implying that (13) is satisﬁed. Then, for all















Clearly, this is independent of z if b(x)=kx for all x ≥ kv, implying there
is no incentive to bid b(z) rather than b(v).
We have now shown there is no incentive to make small, local deviations.
In the following we rule out sizeable deviations as well. Recall that we let
v denote the valuation of the bidder, whereas z denotes the valuation the
bidder pretends to have by bidding b(z). Assume, for now, that b(v) is
strictly increasing.
(a) B(z) ≥ v.W eh a v ea l r e a d ys h o w nt h a ti fv ≥ kv, then it does not pay
to deviate to a z = B(z) >v . Hence, we concentrate on v<k v,a n do b s e r v e



















(v − kz − (b(z) − kz))f(z) ≤ 0 if z>v
k
(kz − b(z))f(z) ≤ 0 if z<v
k
44implying that this type of deviation is unproﬁtable, since it is preferable to
lower z from its level of z ≥ B−1(v) ≥ v.
(b) z>v≥ B(z). T h i si sp o s s i b l eo n l yi fz,v ∈ (v,kv). If a bidder with
valuation v loses stage 1 with a bid of b(z), he will elect not to accept B(z)














Assuming that B(z) is suﬃciently close to z to satisfy (13), and noting that
the right-hand-side of (15) increases faster in v than the left-hand-side, it
follows that the inequality remains satisﬁed for any v<z . The bidder is














and the derivative is
EU
0
















+ kz − b(z)
#







Thus, this type of deviation is unproﬁt a b l et o o ,a si tp a y st ol o w e rz from its
high level.
(c) v ≥ z ≥ B(z). If stage 1 was lost, the bidder can choose to either accept
or reject B(z) in stage 2.

























k ≥ 0 if B(z) <k v
as b(z)=kz when B(z) ≥ kv. Hence, this type of deviation is not proﬁtable
either.
(c2) v ≥ z ≥ B(z), accept B(z) if stage 1 was lost.W e o b s e r v e t h a t
if B(z) ≥ kv, the winner of stage 1 will not accept B(z). Then, the loser
of stage 1 should not accept B(z) either. Since v ≥ B(z) ≥ kv,t h el o s e r
of stage 1 is certain to win a second-price auction, and pay less than B(z).
Hence, in order for it to be a sensible strategy to accept B(z),w em u s ta sa


















and it follows that































As the last term is positive and the ﬁrst converges to (12) for B(x) −→ x,
D(z,v) > 0 for B(·) functions that are close to the 45 degree line.
Finally, if v<k v, D(z,v) is positive for z = v, by (13), i.e. by the fact
that it is optimal to reject the buy-out price in equilibrium. We wish to show














v(z,z) < 0, D0
v(z,kv) > 0 and D00
vv(z,v) > 0, it follows that






























































where the last inequality follows from the fact the function preceding it is
decreasing in v,a n dv<k v.A sB(x) −→ x, this converges to (12).
Hence, we conclude that if (12) is satisﬁed, there exists a B(·) function
close to the 45 degree line, for which there is no incentive to deviate, regard-
less of the bidder’s valuation.
It remains only to verify that b(v) is strictly increasing. However, it is
clear that for B(v) → v (with B0(v) < ∞) this must be the case as b(v) → kv.
Since kJ(v) >J (kv), it follows that the second part of Assumption 3 is
satisﬁed as well, for B(v) → v. This completes the proof of Proposition 6.
47Appendix B
In this appendix we show that all results of Section 3 hold with minor
modiﬁcations when Assumption 1 is not met.
Observe ﬁrst that Proposition 2 and ER1(b v) in Proposition 3 hold even







k(x − b v)f(x)dx
−f(b v)(1 − F(m(b v)))
µ
b v −







k(x − b v)f(x)dx ≤ 0
since m(b v)=v. This immediately implies that the optimal value of b v is v,
and the buy-out price is thus accepted with probability 1.
Furthermore, since kv ≤ v, it is clear that whoever loses stage 1 will win
stage 2 with probability 1, regardless of b v.H e n c e ,b yt h eRevenue Equivalence
Theorem, overall revenue is the same31 regardless of b v.S i n c e ER1(b v) is
decreasing in b v, it follows that ER2(b v) is increasing in b v (the equivalent of
Lemma 2).
In addition, since the optimal value of b v is v, the highest possible revenue
to the ﬁrst seller is ER1(v)=B(v)=kE(v). In stage 2, the loser of stage
1 will win. Deﬁning v(j) as the j0th highest valuation, the expected revenue
is ER2(v)=0 .5kE(v(1))+0 .5kE(v(2)), since any given player wins stage 1








Hence, in what seller 1 considers optimum, he earns the same as seller 2.
Since the sum of revenues is constant, it follows that for any b v>v , seller 1
will be worse oﬀ than seller 2, and we have the equivalent of Proposition 4.
31It is easily seen that an agent of type v is indiﬀerent between the auction formats.
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